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Sports Mega-Events - Three Sites of Contemporary Political Contestation 
 
Abstract 
This article discusses the contemporary politics of sports mega-events, involving the Olympic 
Games and FIFA Men’s Football World Cup Finals as well as other lower ‘order’ sports 
megas, taking two main forms: the promotional and the protest. There is a politics in, and a 
politics of, sports mega-events. The former focuses on the internal politics of the organising 
bodies, such as the IOC and FIFA. This form of politics has been written about elsewhere and 
hence there is no detailed discussion in this article about it. Instead this article offers a brief 
discussion of the range and number of sports mega-events since 2000, an assessment of the 
contemporary politics of sports mega-events, a focus on three main sites of political 
contestation – rights, legacy and labour, and finally it offers conclusions about research into 
the politics of sports mega-events. 
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Sports Mega-Events - Three Sites of Contemporary Political Contestation 
 
Introduction 
This article discusses the contemporary politics of sports mega-events, involving the Olympic 
Games and FIFA Men’s Football World Cup Finals, as well as other lower ‘order’ sports 
megas (Black 2014). For the past 50 years – roughly since the Tokyo Summer Olympics of 
1964  - sports mega-events have been caught up in symbolic politics taking two main forms. 
Firstly, there are the promotional opportunities offered by them to enhance reputations – by 
competing with other cities and nations, winning the right to stage them and actually hosting 
them. This form of politics is sometimes referred to as the exercise of ‘soft power’ or public 
diplomacy, as nations, and increasingly cities, have sought to develop their place in the 
modern world and establish what has been referred to as ‘brand identity’ (Anholt 2008; Grix 
and Houlihan 2013). Refusing to participate in a sports mega-event through different forms of 
boycott can be seen as a form of negative public diplomacy.  
Secondly, there is the opportunity for non-state actors and social movements to protest about 
a perceived social injustice by ‘seizing the platform’ offered by sports mega-events watched 
by hundreds of millions of people and reported on by most of the world’s media (Price 2008). 
The next Summer Olympics after Tokyo 1964, staged in Mexico City in 1968, saw the best 
example of this in the form of the famous ‘salute’ by John Carlos and Tommie Smith in 
support of the Olympic Project for Human Rights (Hartmann 2003; Henderson 2010). More 
recently evictions of low income communities from housing to make way for mega-event 
related projects and other infringements of human rights have also become part of the 
Olympic and FIFA Men’s Football World Cup narrative (COHRE 2008).  
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This article is structured in four sections: a brief discussion of the range and number of sports 
mega-events since 2000; an assessment of the contemporary politics of sports mega-events; a 
focus on three main sites of political contestation – rights, legacy and labour; and finally it 
offers conclusions about research into the politics of sports mega-events. 
 
Defining the Field 
Definitions of mega-events vary across different theoretical understandings and disciplines, 
e.g. economics, geography, political science, urban planning, as well as sociology. In lieu of 
an agreed definition, Roche (2000) offers a way to understand the features of mega-events 
sociologically that has been adopted by many others and is used here – ‘large-scale cultural 
(including commercial and sporting) events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular 
appeal and international significance’ (Roche 2000, 1). These characteristics go some way to 
explain the allure or attraction of sports mega-events to potential host cities or nations. For 
individuals sports mega-events offer the promise of a festival of sport, with emotional 
moments, shaping personal (life) time horizons.  Two features of contemporary sports mega-
events are first then, that they are deemed to have highly significant social, political, 
economic and ideological consequences for the host city, region or nation in which they 
occur, and second, that they will attract considerable media coverage. By this definition, 
therefore, an unmediated mega-event would be a contradiction in terms, and for this reason 
the globally mediated sports genre of mega-event has tended to supplant other forms of 
‘mega’, such as World’s Fairs or Expos, although these latter do continue to be 
enthusiastically hosted and attract substantial numbers of visitors. 
Additionally we need to consider the existence of first, second, third and even lower orders or 
tiers of (sports) mega-events according to their reach and range, cost and size (Black 2014; 
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but also see Müller (2015) who suggests an alternative scheme that attempts to avoid a “’once 
and for all’” classification of specific events). For my purposes in this chapter I will refer to 
the following as amongst the most significant sports mega-events: Tier 1 - Summer Olympic 
Games and FIFA Men’s Football World Cup; Tier 2 - Winter Olympic Games and UEFA 
Men’s EURO Football championship; Tier 3 - Commonwealth Games and Pan American 
Games (see Figure 1).  
Insert Figure 1 Sports Mega-Events 2000-2023 Here 
Since 2000 there have been 23 editions of these six sports mega-events and there are 13 to 
come before 2024. Three hosts are still to be decided (at the time of writing in May 2015) and 
the Commonwealth Games and the Winter Olympics have been experiencing difficulties 
finding hosts recently. Nonetheless the Winter Olympics in 2010 attracted 2,600 competitors, 
the Commonwealth Games in Glasgow in 2014 featured 7,300 sport teams members, and it is 
predicted that the Pan Americans in Toronto in 2015 will see 7,700 competitors.  Flyvbjerg 
(2014) suggests strictly speaking we should distinguish between ‘mega’ (million), ‘giga’ 
(billion), and ‘tera’ (trillion) dollar (USD) -projects depending on their scale. Certainly the 
biggest two sports mega-events routinely now cost several billions of dollars to stage and 
might justifiably be called ‘giga’ events. The sports mega-events staged by members of the 
BRICS alliance (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) since 2000 have also pushed 
the costs of staging events upwards (see Zimbalist 2015). 
Black (2014) argues convincingly that we should look at megas as a means to fund 
development processes and objectives. In doing so they will inevitably benefit certain 
interests, not all interests. With respect to ‘second-order’ megas, they are attractive to second 
tier locales in the globalized world for two main reasons. First, the more ‘relevance 
challenged’ mega-events can offer the only realistic means of pursuing event-centred 
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development for certain urban areas. Some places can never realistically aspire to host an 
Olympic Games or host the FIFA World Cup finals. This was found out by Birmingham and 
Manchester in England as three bids in the 1980s and 1990s failed to attract enough attention 
from IOC members. Today this also applies to cities such as Glasgow in Scotland, which 
hosted the Commonwealth Games in 2014, and Edmonton (Canada) that was in competition 
with Durban (South Africa) to host the 2022 edition of the Commonwealth Games until the 
city withdrew citing economic reasons. Second, lower order mega-events can act as 
‘springboards’ for cities to go on to bid to host first order mega-events.  This was the strategy 
that the municipality of Rio de Janeiro took, to first host a smaller scale event (the Pan 
Americans in 2007) and then bid to host the summer Olympics. It is thought that if Durban is 
successful with its bid to host the Commonwealth Games in 2022, which now looks highly 
likely as it is the sole candidate, that this might be used to launch a bid to host the Summer 
Olympics in 2024 or 2028. Thus it is that even the process of bidding to host a sports mega-
event can be seen as full of political calculation. 
There is a politics in, and a politics of, sports mega-events. The former focuses on the 
internal politics of the organising bodies, such as the IOC and FIFA. This form of politics is 
dealt with elsewhere (e.g. see Tomlinson 2014) and hence there is no detailed discussion in 
this article about, for example, the controversy over potential corruption in the bidding 
process in the selection of hosts for recent and future FIFA men’s football World Cups (Conn 
2015). The external politics of sports mega-events, which this paper deals with, relates to 
corporate interests and global forces in combination with, or confrontation with, local 
interests, and it is to this that we now turn. 
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Contemporary Politics 
It is important to realize that the politics of each and every sports mega-event is conjunctural 
– that means that it will be affected by different political circumstances at local, national, 
regional and global scales at different times and places. Nonetheless since the 1970s there has 
been concern about ‘gigantism’ and ‘white elephants’ in the Olympics – the growth in scale 
of the events on one hand and the potential to build facilities and stadia that will be more 
costly to use and maintain than they are worth on the other. Economists and other social 
scientists have assessed sports mega-events in terms of their costs and benefits (Preuss 2004; 
Whitson and Horne 2006). Flyvbjerg (2014) suggests that an iron law of mega projects, 
including sports mega-events, is that they will be ‘over budget, over time, over and over 
again’. Whether this is a constant or not it is certainly the case that most sports mega-events 
since the 1970s have attracted political controversy.  
 
Horne (2007, 86-91) identified a number of ‘known unknowns’ with respect to sports mega-
events that have remained part of the political debate about sports mega-events. These 
include: the emphasis on consumption-based development as opposed to social redistribution 
with respect to the goals of hosting sports mega-events; urban regeneration that often leads to 
´gentrification´ of specific areas being regenerated; the displacement (and subsequent 
‘replacement’) of poor and less powerful communities of people; the use of (often quite 
extensive) public sector funds to enhance private corporate sector gain; the local host sites 
and spaces benefitting global flows of capital, trade and finance; the spatial concentration of 
the impact of the event; the impacts on employment of hosting sports mega-events – and the 
duration of its impact; the impact on tourism flows never being near what is predicted by 
sports mega-event boosters mainly because of the displacement of non-sport tourists by the 
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sport-event tourists; the way in which boosters have to resort to the manufacturing of the 
consent of local and national publics to get them on their side about staging the event; and the 
growth of opposition event coalitions as a result of some or all of these developments. 
As mentioned earlier, symbolic politics – the promotional politics of promotional culture via 
public diplomacy, ‘soft power’ and/ or propaganda – are fundamental features of the 
contemporary politics of sports mega-events. Whether competing with other cities or nations 
to host an event, winning the right to do so, or actually hosting an event, the potential for 
symbolic power plays, or pitfalls, are real. All such exercises in promotional politics - nation 
branding, city branding, image alteration – run the danger of heightening reputational risk to 
the bidders (and eventual hosts) involved. According to the 2014 Anholt-GfK survey of 
national image, rather than boost Brazil’s reputation in the world, hosting the 2014 World 
Cup Finals saw the country lose ground in the rankings whilst World Cup winners Germany 
knocked the USA off the top spot after 5 years (Anholt-GfK Roper 2014; Garcia 2014). 
Another aspect of political controversy since ‘9/11’ (in 2001), and that stretches further back 
to the ‘Munich’ terrorist attack (in 1972), has been the relationship between the staging of 
sports mega-events and the growth of the security state. Societies have seen a continuing 
transformation of surveillance capabilities as the supposed threat of terrorist attack has 
grown. Sports mega-events have offered opportunities for new security equipment and 
procedures and surveillance operations to be trialled. As these three features – costs, 
reputational risk and security - have developed so too have other related sites of contestation, 
and some of these are identified in Figure 2.  
Insert Figure 2 Sports Mega-Events and Contentious Issues Here 
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Three Sites of Contestation 
According to the late sociologist and criminologist Stanley Cohen (2001, 51) denial is ‘the 
maintenance of social worlds in which an undesirable situation (event, condition, 
phenomenon) is unrecognised, ignored or made to seem normal’. Without the opposite of 
denial, acknowledgement, it is impossible to reach a situation of reconciliation between two 
or more opposing groups. With mega-event organizers and their representatives we do not 
often get acknowledgement of problematic situations, but usually denials. I now discuss in 
brief the politics of rights, legacy and labour in relation to sports mega-events, which have 
been acknowledged by some but not given the focus that they deserve until now (Giulianotti 
et al (2014) identified a ‘politics of mobility’ at the London 2012 Olympics but this is not 
considered in detail here). 
Rights  
Worden (2015, 1) identified five main human rights abuses have been apparent at recent and 
future sports mega-events:  
1. The forced evictions of citizens without due process or compensation;  
2. The abuse and exploitation of migrant workers;  
3. The silencing of civil society and rights activists;  
4. Threats, intimidation and arrest of journalists; and  
5. Discrimination within nations competing to host or simply competing at the mega-
events. 
After Athens hosted the Summer Olympic Games in 2004, and with Beijing the next host, 
Jacques Rogge, then President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), made the 
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comment that ‘The IOC is always in favour of maximum application of human rights…But it 
is not up to the IOC to monitor human rights’ (cited in Kelso 2004). Nonetheless the build up 
to Beijing 2008 over the next four years saw an unprecedented focus by campaigners on 
human rights. Seeking to use the first Olympics in China to highlight human rights abuses the 
official torch relay was subverted and the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) 
in Geneva published a dossier itemizing the displacements of hundreds of thousands of 
people to make way for the games (on the torch relay see Horne and Whannel 2010; COHRE 
2008). 
Narratives associated with hosting mega-events, and the Summer Olympic Games in 
particular, in East Asia and developing economies have included the following: that it 
provides an opportunity to catch up or modernize, an opportunity to challenge (Western) 
modernity, and an opportunity to project distinctive forms of hybrid or hyper-modernity. 
Whether in the form of overt politics, protest, or promotion, hosting a sports 'mega’ event 
provides an opportunity for power plays by states, civic authorities, and groups for and 
against the event. Attempts to hijack the torch relay before Beijing 2008 actually provoked a 
nationalist response, when previously the Olympics were being promoted as an 
internationalising event. The Western media tended to portray the events of London, Paris 
and San Francisco as peaceful protests against a repressive regime and a military crackdown. 
The Chinese media eventually responded by considering the events as violent acts against 
innocent people (especially the disabled ‘heroine’ of Paris, Jin Jing) requiring the restoration 
of order and stability (Horne and Whannel 2010). In this way, different actors sought to 
impose their frames of reference on the situation.  
The prominence of rights discourse remains the case for other mega-events that have taken 
place since 2008 in different parts of the world. When thousands of Brazilians took to the 
streets during the Confederations Cup in June 2013, FIFA President Sepp Blatter said on 
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national television that ‘I can understand people are not happy but they should not use 
football to make their demands heard’ (cited in Watts 2013). Yet symbolic transformations of 
urban environments to fit global expectations of modernity – expressing security, order, and 
economic success in vibrant, exciting, safe, places, ‘open for business’ – tend to impact on 
the quality of life of inhabitants and most negatively on poor and marginal populations 
(Broudehoux 2015). Ahead of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic and 
Paralympic Games in Rio de Janeiro for example, campaigners have identified concerns over 
the rights of children, workers, women, the disabled, LGBT, marginal populations, the 
socially excluded, and the environment (ANCOP 2014; see also, Horne and Silvestre 2015). 
Issues surrounding rights of access to facilities built at public expense, the removal of poor 
communities from housing and evictions, have created struggles over whom or what is 
(made) visible. 
Legacy  
The question of developing a legacy through hosting an Olympic Games or other sports 
mega-event was, until recently, a relatively low order issue and one that was not seriously 
entertained until after an event had been concluded. While all cities had a general legacy 
vision, which was set out in bid books, no detailed operational plans were developed before 
the Games about how legacy would be implemented afterwards. Legacy plans were not 
seriously explored until after the Games had been staged when there was a diminished 
interest in Olympic matters. The International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) interest in an 
Olympic city largely ceased once the Games had been staged so there was no monitoring or 
evaluation of post-Games legacy implementation. The concept of ‘legacy’ came of age in the 
early years of the present century as governments recognized more clearly the potential utility 
of hosting as a tool in achieving a range of sport and non-sport policy objectives (Cashman 
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and Horne 2013). It also developed as more concern was expressed about the costs of staging 
the events. 
It is useful to consider two distinctions with respect to legacies when considering the political 
implications – that they can be tangible and intangible, and also universal and selective (for 
further discussion see Horne 2015; Cashman and Horne 2013). It is well established that 
legacies related to sports mega-events can be tangible, that is related to, for example, changes 
in some way to the material infrastructure or economic performance of the city or nation, and 
intangible, that is related to, for example, emotional responses to a mega-event whether 
individual or collective (Preuss 2007). Tangible legacies refer to substantial and long 
standing changes to the urban infrastructure – the building of iconic stadia being one of the 
most notable when it comes to sports mega-events. The intangible legacies of sports mega-
events refer predominantly to popular memories, evocations and analyses of specific 
moments and incidents associated with an event.  
A second distinction I want to suggest when thinking about legacy is that legacies can be 
selective and universal. By this distinction I mean the following. Selective legacies are 
particular, individualist, and elitist, and tend to serve the interests of those dominating 
powerful political and economic positions in society. Universal legacies are communal, 
collectivist, and inherently democratic, available to all by virtue of being made freely 
accessible. A problem for sports mega-events is that they largely generate tangible legacies 
that are selective and intangible legacies that are universal. Selective legacies are of benefit, 
enjoyed, and delivered to specific individuals or interests, rather than all, and exclude those 
considered not eligible to receive them. As Titmuss (1974) suggested with respect to 
selectivism in social policy, selectivism also serves to facilitate the sovereignty of the market. 
Universal legacies on the other hand are those that affect, reach and are shared by all rather 
than specific individuals or communities. Legacies established universally to serve everybody 
	   13	  
might need to be financed by governments, philanthropic organizations or, exceptionally, 
private enterprises. Prioritising universal legacies would mean that organisers of sports mega-
events would be obligated to deliver them to all without constraints. Rather than vague claims 
regarding legacy they would have to demonstrate a properly funded legacy management 
programme that continued for some years after the event. As Titmuss (1974, 39) suggested 
with respect to universalism in social policy, it is a re-distributive institutional approach; it 
considers welfare (that is, ‘positive legacies’) as a very important institution of society 
provided outside the market. For sports mega-events to live up to the promotional claims 
made for them the legacies associated with them should follow the principle of universalism 
and this would require greater control and regulation over FIFA, the IOC and LOCs by non-
market actors. 
The politics of legacy associated with sports mega-events is quite well illustrated by the three 
quotations from Lord Sebastian Coe (Figure 3), the chair of the London Organising 
Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG) for London 2012. Over the six 
years as the build up to the games took place and the event itself approached there was a clear 
diminishing of focus on legacy and a distancing of responsibility from delivering on it. 
Insert Figure 3 Lord Coe on the 2012 Legacy Here 
 
London’s bid to stage the 2012 Summer Olympics was fashioned in the context of greater 
awareness of legacy (Davies 2012). In this respect London was the first true ‘legacy’ 
Olympics in so far as the IOC had not used the concept widely before and had only staged its 
first conference on legacy in 2002, just two years before London submitted its bid book. 
Since then it has become mandatory for a city to articulate at the bid stage both a vision of 
how the host city and country would benefit from the staging of the Games and how its 
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operational plans about the realisation of legacy would be implemented. The same also 
applies now to other mega-events such as the Commonwealth Games and Pan American 
Games.  
It has been suggested that one of the reasons why London won its bid in 2005 to stage the 
2012 Olympic Games was that it had attractive legacy plans in key areas: sport, youth and the 
regeneration of a part of East London. However the actual delivery of some of the six legacy 
promises is proving challenging. For example, one of the promises was to ‘inspire a new 
generation of young people to take part in local volunteering, cultural and physical activity’ 
(Horne and Houlihan 2014). Six of the local authorities closest to the Olympic site in east 
London were designated as ‘Olympic Boroughs’. It was reported in November 2014 that two 
of them – Newham, the municipal authority containing Stratford, where most of the 2012 
Olympics took place, and Dagenham and Redbridge - had the lowest physical activity rates in 
the whole of England. Over 39 per cent and 38 per cent respectively of people in these 
Boroughs were physically inactive (Campbell 2014). 
 
Labour  
The labour involved in putting on a sports mega-event includes paid and unpaid workers; 
migrant workers of the global precariat who barely scrape a living wage and those on or 
earning less than the minimum wage; those who work on the supply chains providing 
equipment, clothing and footwear; as well as those selling merchandise associated with 
events. In addition there are the globetrotting elite professional mega-event management 
experts and consultants. As a result of the governance of the Olympics being increasingly 
exposed to market-based mechanisms for example – such as private finance initiatives, the 
codification of rules and service standards, and the formalisation of oversight - an ‘Olympic 
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“consultocracy” or “caravan” has developed (Cashman and Harris 2012) that ‘wanders 
nomadically from Games to Games’ (Jennings 2012: 3). 
 Few researchers have looked at this aspect of sports mega-events in detail, including the 
terms, conditions and safety record of the occupations required (although on London 2012 
see Cohen 2013). In addition to paid workers, volunteers play a major role in the delivery of 
the events. 70,000 ‘Games Makers’ were trained for London 2012 (and the same number is 
required for Rio 2016). 12,500  ‘Clydesiders’ helped at the Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth 
Games, whilst others in Glasgow were trained in customer care based on principles of the 
Disney Corporation (see BBC 2014). As Raco (2014, 176) suggests recent sports mega-
events – including London 2012 – have been characterized by ‘the prioritization of delivery 
over representative democracy’. As a result democratic imperatives, ‘such as those around 
sustainability and employment rights’ have been institutionally re-placed and converted into 
contractual requirements on firms’. Whilst London 2012 had an excellent safety record with 
respect to the building of the Olympic Park, in the build up to the 2014 World Cup in Brazil 
at least 10 construction workers died; and two drivers were killed when a flyover collapsed in 
Belo Horizonte just before a semi-final match in July 2014. 
Since the decision to award the 2022 FIFA World Cup Finals to Qatar in 2010 concerns have 
been expressed about the ‘kafala’ sponsorship system that operates in Qatar and other Middle 
East countries. The system requires that migrant workers surrender their passports to their 
sponsors, who effectively decide if they can leave employment or not. Investigative reporting 
has found that several hundreds of workers on World Cup related projects have died since 
2010 (Black et al. 2014). Sandra Burrow, International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) 
Secretary General, stated in 2014 that ‘FIFA, the athletics body IAAF, multinationals and 
others which are getting a free ride on the back of modern slavery in Qatar should be 
ashamed to be in league with a dictatorship like this’ (quoted in Dorsey 2014). 
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The following two quotations, both from Sepp Blatter, FIFA President, during a talk he gave 
at Oxford University in October 2013, allude to the work involved in putting on a World Cup, 
Olympics or other sports mega-event. On the one hand Blatter acknowledged that  “Football 
has the power to build a better future…[FIFA’s job is]... helping communities in need 
through football” (quoted in Hyde 2013b). However when challenged about the working 
conditions of migrant workers in Qatar preparing the ground for the 2022 World Cup finals, 
he also stated that “We are not the ones that can actually change it…This is not FIFA’s 
remit” (quoted in Hyde 2013b). 
Timms (2012 and n/d) discusses the way that the anti-sweat shop campaign ‘Play Fair’ uses 
the platform of the Olympics, how it has developed, and its form for 2012. Play Fair brings 
together a number of labour rights groups to 'use the hook, unashamedly, of the biggest 
sporting event in the world'. In using the Olympic Games as a platform for its protest, Play 
Fair is an example of how activists can mobilise or hijack for their own purposes a platform 
that has already been created (as great cost) by others. As pointed out by Price (2008, 86), 
this type of platform is a 'relatively unexplored vehicle for systematic communication', and 
the value and reach of the Olympic platform presents a very particular opportunity for those 
able to mobilise it. Whilst the Olympics have long been used to promote specific causes, 
Timms identifies three ways it can be useful for the issue of labour rights. Firstly, the garment 
industry represents a significant proportion of the global labour market, with over 40 million 
workers; including some of the poorest, least organised and protected workers, who are 
disproportionately women. Campaigners claim employment can involve long hours, pressure 
to work at unrealistic speeds, low wages, dangerous conditions, intimidation, and little access 
to unions (Timms n/d). Sporting goods are a high profile part of this industry, and therefore 
the Olympics provide a platform to coordinate campaigns and to call for industry-wide 
improvements. Secondly, ethical campaigning on supply chains has had some success in 
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establishing responsible governance as an issue that companies need to address. Major targets 
have been sports related, such as Adidas, Puma and Nike, many of whom are associated with 
the Olympics. This has allowed Play Fair to monitor the voluntary standards companies have 
agreed, drawing on the weight of Olympic bodies to add pressure.  Thirdly, key elements of 
the Olympic platform offer specific opportunities for Play Fair, and not only its global reach. 
Putting on an Olympic event involves systems of licensing - for merchandise, suppliers, and 
sponsors, and Play Fair claim that Olympic officials could significantly impact working 
conditions if contracts were only granted to companies meeting internationally agreed labour 
standards. For example, merchandising for London 2012 involved 10,000 product lines from 
over 60 licensees. Then there is also the Olympic ethos, with the Olympic Charter promoting 
positive universal principles. This is used by Play Fair to argue that some Olympic suppliers 
violate the Charter, due to exploitative conditions.  
 
Conclusions 
Hosting the Olympic Games (and other mega-events) is a political act; public events and 
institutions involving decisions over the allocation of resources have political dimensions. 
They require consideration of the distribution of power, struggles and who gains from the 
situation. The increasingly corporate character of sports mega-events leads to various civic 
responses to their social impacts and legacies (Giulianotti et al 2014b). Whilst security risk 
management differs between the World Cup and the Olympics, there are considerable 
opportunities for markets in security to develop around sports mega-events. This can have 
consequences for civil rights and concerns about the militarization of urban locations. Hyde 
(2013a) asks: ‘if hosting an Olympics or a World Cup were even remotely likely to advance 
the cause of human freedom in their countries, does anyone think the likes of China and 
	   18	  
Qatar would be as keen to host them as they are?’ In response to her question she cited FIFA 
Secretary General, Jérôme Valcke, who commented: “‘less democracy is sometimes better 
for organising a World Cup”’ (cited in Hyde 2013a). 
Zimbalist (2015, 122) suggests, ‘Hosting sports mega-events…tends to reinforce the existing 
power structure and patterns of inequality’. Sports mega-events also tend to impact 
negatively on poor people – through pre-event construction and the post-event 
‘gentrification’ of locations; and the crowding out of other spending on welfare and the 
general redirection of scarce resources toward the priority of delivering a mega-event. The 
2010 World Cup in South Africa presented several examples where the trade-off between 
housing projects for people in need and the building of a stadium went in favour of the latter. 
Profit and event delivery come before democracy and social justice leading to a variety of 
responses and resistances. One of the unintended legacies of hosting a World Cup is that it 
can lead to social mobilization – and sometimes confrontations as was witnessed in Brazil in 
2013 and 2014. Some organizers have attempted the integration and incorporation of NGOS 
and protest groups into the planning of events. But the mobilization of people and 
communities affected remains one of the most unstable and unpredictable of the social 
legacies of hosting sports mega-events. Flyvbjerg et al (2012) argue that social scientists 
should investigate the ‘tension points’ in mega projects. I have tried to identify some of those 
involved with sports mega-events in this article. Other examples of ‘seizing the platform’ 
(Price 2008) will become available as protest and event coalitions and activism develop in the 
future (Boykoff 2011, 2014). The contemporary contestation of sports mega-events remains a 
continuing story.  
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Figure 1 Sports Mega-Events in the 21st Century: 2000 – 2023 
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Figure 3 Lord Coe on the London Olympics 2012 Legacy 
Sebastian Coe, 
May 2006 
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last accessed 25 November 2014]. 
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